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NOTES
MASTER AND SERVANT - WORKMEN!S COMPENSATION ACTS - NA-
TURE AND GROUNDS OF MASTER'S LIABILITY-INJURIES ARISING OUT
OF COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-ACCIDENTAL INJuRIEs-HERNIA.-The
practitioner acquainted with procedure and practice under the Work-
men's Compensation Acts is well aware that not all injuries suffered
by an employee are compensable. It frequently occurs that the sole
inquiry resolves itself to one issue, Was the complainant's condition
caused by a compensable injury? Necessarily, if the state act covers
only "accidental injuries" or "personal injury by accident," and does
not broadly scope all injuries incurred in industry, the affirmative de-
termination of the above inquiry is a condition precedent to further
consideration by the commission or industrial board.
In both the Indiana 1 and Michigan 2 Acts, as in fact the majority
of statutes, there is specified an "accidental injury." It is the purpose
of the writer to discuss, within the limited confines of this note, the
status of hernia, hemorrhages, and strains as compensable injuries
within the terms of such acts. Where, concededly, the hernia is caused
by blows, sudden or unusual strains producing injury, or other ac-
1 IND. STAT. ANw. (Bums, 1933) § 1701.
2 Micr. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 8407 et seq.
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cidents, it is clearly compensable. The writer narrows his attention to
those situations in which the hernia is occasioned by the employee's
work done in the ordinary, usual manner. In such cases, as herein-
after developed, there is a conflict of authority as to whether there
can be a recovery. The Michigan Supreme Court has consistently re-
fused to allow compensation in such cases. Its attitude in that respect
is given a harsh test by a very recent case which on the face of the
facts would appear to strongly warrant recovery.3 Therein, the Court
held that a salesman who had suffered an inguinal hernia, as a result
of lifting a cash register from a car seat and carrying it to a store to
exhibit to a prospective customer in his common way of doing his
work, had not suffered an accidental injury and therefore compensable
injury within the Michigan Act. The Court says: "The fact that the
plaintiff reached down slightly to lift the register did not render the
hernia the result of an untoward or fortuitous happening." The Michi-
gan Court expressly follows the case of Kutsckmar v. Briggs Mfg.
Co.,4 which held that a workman who ruptured himself by lifting a
heavy iron bar in his usual and ordinary employment in the usual and
ordinary way without the intervention of any untoward or accidental
happening, had not suffered an accidental injury within the Michigan
Act. This case has been much criticized and is declared to be against
the great weight of authority both in this country and England. 5
Other Michigan cases definitely and consistently place that State then
in a decidedly minority position." Says the Court in the Kutschmar
case: "To justify compensation for accidental injuries, there must
have been some unusual, fortuitous or unexpected happening which
caused the injury and which was in essence, accidental in character."
Thus does Michigan align herself with the English cases of the turn
of the century which construed the English Act in a similar way7 An
3 Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 262 N. W. 306 (Mich. 1935).
4 163 N. W. 933 (Mich. 1917). Accord: Alpert v. Powers, 119 N. E. 229 (N.
Y. 1918) (The court said that "hernia is a disease arising out of natural causes,
as well as an accident, and that it was therefore incumbent upon claimant to
show that his employment caused the injury, and that the injury was assignable
to a determinate or single act identifiable in space and time . . . to something
catastrophic or extraordinary."); Lerner v. Bump, 149 N. E. 334 (N. Y. 1925);
Sanders v. Fuller, 205 N. Y. S. 295 (1924); Westbrook v. Highview, 157 S. E.
362 (Ga. 1931).
5 See: Annotation, L. R. A. 1918B, 1133; WORx..&N'S CoMPENsATiow AcTs,
71 C. J. 621; Annotation, L. R. A. 1916A, 32, 228, 304; Annotation, L. R. A.
1917D, 108, 111; HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1931) 401.
6 Tackles v. Bryant & Detwiler Co., 167 N. W. 36 (Mich. 1918); Sinkiewicz
v. Lee & Cady, 263 N. W. 784 (Mich. 1931).
7 Roper v. Greenwood, 83 L. T. R. (N. S.) 471 (1901); Perry v. Baker,
3 W. C. C. (Eng. 1901) 29. Professor Bohlen says that under this early state of
Compensation Law no injury was regarded as sustained by an accident where
the workman was harmed while doing the very work he was employed to do
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actual accident is required to render the hernia compensable. These
English cases were overruled by Fenton v. Thorley & Co.,8 which
settled the question under the English Act.
In any discussion of the American compensation acts, the important
effect of the English Act and the constructions thereon, cannot be mini-
mized, for the term "personal injury by accident," and indeed almost
every other important provision, was copied into the various American
acts, from the English Act of 1876 (amended in 1906). The construc-
tions, then, of the English courts of the term under examination, are
of importance in emphasizing and explaining the trend of the American
courts." In the famous case of Fenton v. Thorley & Co.l0 the em-
ployee was ruptured while moving a wheel in his usual manner, and
the court held that "despite the absence of any slip, wrench, sudden
jerk or external force, the injury, having been unexpectedly and un-
designedly incurred in the course of employment was caused by an
'accident' within the Compensation Act." 11
It is not to be supposed that Michigan, any less than other Ameri-
can jurisdictions in construing their new statutory mediums for set-
tling master-servant disputes, was not affected by this and subsequent
English decisions. The case of La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co. 12 bears
witness to the contrary. Therein was involved a ruptured blood yes-
under the conditions usual thereto. Bohlen, The Drafting of Workman's Com-
pensation Acts (1912) 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 338. This appears to be the precise
attitude of the Michigan Court at the present time.
8 [1903] A. C. 443.
9 An interesting and scholarly discussion of the effect of the English Act
and the court constructions thereon, especially of the term "personal injury by
accident," by the American courts, is contained in Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray,
171 S. E. 686 (Va. 1933), See, also, Walton, Worknen's Compensation and the
Theory of Professional Risk (1911) 11 COL. L. REV. 36.
10 Op. cit. supra note 8.
11 See, also: Timmins v. Leeds Forge Co., 16 L. T. R. 521 (1900); Neville
v. Kelley & Mitchell, 1 B. W. C. C. 432 (1907); Lancaster v. Blackwell Colliery
Co., 122 L. T. R. (N. S.) 152 (1920). Professor Bohlen, in his article commented
on in note 7, supra, criticizes the aforesaid English cases for giving such a broad
meaning to accidents and failing to differentiate between diseases and accidents.
In effect, Professor Bohlen lays down the rationale of the present Michigan Court.
In Fenton v. Thorley & Co., supra note 8, the term "accident" is used in the lay
or ordinary and popular sense. It might be submitted that the lay meaning is too
uncertain to be of much value. However, since the case of Fenton v. Thorley &
Co., the great weight of authority both in this country and in England supports
the view, that nothing more is required than that the plaintiff's injury be unex-
pected, and that unusual or external causes are unnecessary.
12 190 Mich. 604, 157 N. W. 72 (1916). It is interesting to note that this
case has never been cited, to the writer's knowledge, in any subsequent Michigan
case involving hernia, strain or similar injury, unaccompanied by a fortuitous cir-
cumstance. It is submitted that the award of the Industrial Accident Board is
more in accord with the majority holding in this country than with the later
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sel resulting from heat and excessive exertion by the employee in a
boiling room of the employer's, and it was conceded that there had
been no visible accident and no event causing external violence to the
employee's body. There was nothing to indicate that the workman
was not doing his work other than in his usual manner. Citing the
English cases, and, particularly, Fenton v. Thorley & Co., the Michi-
gan Court affirmed the award to the employee, observing that the
result could be traced to the unusual hours of work and conditions
and was an unexpected consequence from the continued work in the
excessively warm room. This decision has, however, had but little
effect on subsequent cases involving hernias and kindred injuries of
the nature under examination, and it cannot be said that the Michigan
Court today adopts as liberal an attitude. It instead insists on some,
even though slight, untoward occasion, actually accidental, to render
the injury compensable. How slight is evidenced by the case of Cros-
by v. Thorpe, Hawley & Co.,13 in which it was held that a traveling
salesman, hurrying with heavy grips to a station, became excited when
he heard the train pulling in and broke a blood vessel in his brain,
had suffered an accidental injury.
An accident is distinguished in that it arises from a definite, fixed,
traceable event, thus differing from an occupational disease which de-
velops gradually over a long period of time.14 Before Wisconsin
Michigan cases. It should be noted that while the court therein speaks of "un-
usual hours of work" and the "excessively warm room," these were but the con-
ditions under which the employee worked, and therefore not untoward.
13 172 N. W. 535 (Mich. 1919). In reference thereto, the commentor in 18
MIcH. L. REv. 72 remarks that this case is in line with the English cases, especially
Fenton v. Thorley & Co. The present writer believes that it is more in reason to
regard this case as simply presenting that untoward, fortuitous, occasion, even
though minimal, which the Michigan Court has consistently required since the
Kutschmar case. See, also: Schanning v. Standard Castings Co., 169 N. W. 879
(Mich. 1918); Shaw v. Packard Motor Car Co., 183 N. W. 767 (Mich. 1921);
Helder v. Luce Furniture Co., 187 N. W. 263 (Mich. 1922); Smallegan v. John
Smallegan & Sons, 256 N. W. 435 (Mich. 1934).
14 WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION AcTs, 71 C. J. 602. It was because of this
essential distinction that Bohlen critized the English cases, particularly Fenton v.
Thorley & Co. See Note 11 supra. What is termed an "accident" must be some-
thing out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to time and
place. Barron v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 36 S. W. (2d) 464 (Tex. 1931);
Scheerens v. Edwards & Sons, 232 N. Y. S. 557 (1929); AcCIDENT, 1. C. J: 390;
1 BouvixR LAw DIcT. (Rawle's Third Revision) 101; Checkver, Treating Disease
as a Personal Injury Accident under Workmen's Compensation Acts (1928) 14 VA.
L. RFv. 358.
Idiopathic diseases are not treated by the courts as coming within the mean-
ing of "accidental injuries," but rather as belonging to the category of occupa-
tional diseases. Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 242 Pac. 765 (Okla. 1925); Renkel
v. Industrial Commission, 141 N. E. 834 (Ohio, 1923); Moore v. Service Motor
Truck Co., 142 N. E. 19 (Ind. App. 1924); WoRKUMN'S COMPENSATION AcTs,
71 C. J. 574, 99. That a disease may be traumatic and constitute a personal in-
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changed its act from "personal injury accidentally sustained" to any
and all industrial injuries, 15 the Supreme Court of that state adopted
the same interpretation as that of the Michigan Court. The compen-
sation reports of that period are illuminating. Says the Wisconsin
Commission on one occasion:'( "Inguinal hernias rarely come from
accident. The accident is the occasion, rather than the cause, of the
hernia. Such hernias ordinarily come from inherited or acquired weak-
ness and come through process of gradual development. The immedi-
ate propulsion usually comes from a slight strain resulting from or-
dinary work. The injured party is apt to think that the hernia is the
result of severe strain, and when he notices it, tries to fix in his mind
the time and place when he received such strain. There can be no
doubt that hernias are sometimes the result of accident, but it . . .
appears that they are scldom traunmatic." The last statement is, of
course, true, for the term "accident" is broad enough to include a
hernia sustained by muscular strain.'1
Because the writer is particularly interested in the Michigan set-up,
he has perhaps devoted too much attention to what is really minority
law in this country. The majority of the courts I' generally allow com-
pensation in cases of strain or hernia from over-exertion, even though
occasioned by the employee's work performed in the normal manner. 19
These courts place a very liberal construction on their Compensation
Acts, and the specification "by accident," holding that in cases of
hernias and strains an unforeseen, fortuitous, outside, physical force
which causes the injury is unnecessary; that if the injury itself is re-
ceived unexpectedly and in the course of employment from an un-
jury by accident, see WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs, 71 C. J. 589. Occupa-
tional diseases are now expressly included in the statutes of several states, Wis-
consin notably taking the lead, and New York, Illinois, Connecticut and other
states having like amendments. See Weinrich v. Industrial Commission, 196 N. W.
824 (Wis. 1924).
15 Wis. STAT. (1929) § 102.35. The Wisconsin Act allows compensation for
all injuries, including occupational diseases, growing out of and incidental to the
employment, in addition to accidental injuries.
16 Herman Seiffert v. City of Milwaukee, 2 Wis. W. C. R. 66 (1913). In
6 Wis. W. C. R. 81 the Commission says that it is practically impossible for
hernias to occur otherwise than from predisposition, and that when that viewed as
accidental, the "progress of the hernia sac must come coincidental to some ac-
cident or some sudden and unexpected strain."
17 WORKMEN'S COmIPENSATION ACTS, 71 C. J. 620 (§ 373).
18 See authorities cited in references in Note 5, supra.
19 Terre Haute Malleable & Mfg. Co. v. Wehrle, 132 N. E. 698 (Ind. App.
1921); Poccardi v. Public Service Comm., 84 S. E. 242 (W. Va. 1915); Krenz v.
Ferguson Coal Co., 154 N. E. 35 (Ind. App. 1926); Stacey Bros. Gas Const. Co.
v. Massey, 175 N. E. 368 (Ind. App. 1931); Johnson v. La Bolt Oil Co., 252
N. W. 869 (S. D. 1934); Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray, 171 S. E. 686 (Va. 1933);
Brown v. Casualty Co., 174 S. E. 359 (Ga. 1934); Baggott Co. v. Commission,
125 N. E. 524 (Ill. 1919); Annotation, 98 A. L. R. 205.
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known cause, it is an accidental and, therefore, compensable injury.20
The better view would seem to be that any event not intended or fore-
seen by the injured employee himself is an accident. At least, this
view is more in alignment with the humane purpose of the Compen-
sation Acts. That this is the attitude of the majority of the American
courts, as well as the English, is patent. The contention that an ex-
ternal, violent, or accidental means is required to render an injury ac-
cidental, has been rejected by both federal and the majority of state
courts. 21 Injury by accident does not necessarily imply a direct ap-
plication of external force. Accident, according to the majority con-
struction, is "the unforeseen, inducing, circumstance or cause, that
than the direct means by which the injury is produced." 22
The mere fact that the claimant may have a weakness in his body
structure, or some predisposing physical condition, even a predisposi-
tion to hernia, or a preexistent ailment which has been accelerated or
aggravated, has been held not to prevent recovery.
23
Hernia is unlike most other injuries; in that it is very difficult to
trace its cause. The Michigan Court is not so unreasonable as it may
at first blush appear, in regarding hernia as strictly as it does. There
is much merit in its position that under its present statutory set-up,
some fortuitous, unusual event, as an accident, must concur to render
the injury compensable. Under the construction adopted, it is felt
that the remedy lies not with the courts, but with the legislature, if
a more liberal regard for hernia injuries is desired. That hernia cases
are complex enough to warrant separate statutory treatment is evi-
denced by the number of acts which specifically deal with hernia, thus
20 Brown v. Casualty Co., op. cit. supra note 19.
21 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 61 Fed. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932). See cases in note 19, supra.
A very liberal construction is uniformly given the Workmen's Compensation
Acts by these courts. For example, the Indiana Court, in Empire Health & Ac-
cident Ins. Co. v. Purcell, 132 N. E. 664 (Ind. App. 1921), says: "The words, 'by
accident,' as used in the Compensation Act should be given a liberal construction
in order that the humane purpose of its enactment may be realized."
22 Comment (1917) 26 YALE L. JouR. 328.
23 Johnson v. La Bolt Oil Co., op. cit. supra note 19; Hurley v. Seldon Breck
Construction Co., 159 N. W. 311 (Mich. 1916); Puritan Bed Spring Co. v. Wolfe,
120 N. E. 417 (Ind. App. 1918); Retter v. Industrial Comm., 184 N. E. 654 (Ill.
1933); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 186 N. E. 10 (Ohio, 1933); McCarthy v.
Industrial Commission, 215 N. W. 824 (Wis. 1927); ScHNEmER, WoRKmN's
CoiumsATiox LAW (2d ed. 1932) 603, 1815, 1827. Of course, the employee has
the burden of proving a causal connection between the alleged injury and the
resulting condition, and it therefore follows that should the reverse be established,
to wit, a causal connection between the weakened physical condition and the re-
sulting injury, recovery would be denied. Sanitary District of Chicago v. In-
dustrial Commission, 175 N. E. 372 (Ill. 1931); WoRxmme's COMPENsATIoN
Acis, 71 C. J. 622.
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recognizing the social desire to compensate bona fide injuries of this
nature, and at the same time provide a hedge against fictitious claims.
These statutes require in effect that the complainant prove that the
hernia was of recent origin.2 4 For example, that inability to work im-
mediately followed,25 or that the hernia appeared suddenly or im-
mediately and was accompanied with pain and did not exist prior to
the alleged accident.
26
In the absence of any statutory requirement of corroboration, it
should seem that no court ought arbitrarily attach to the remedy as a
condition, corroboration of the claim, such as immediate prostration,
breakdown or cessation of work. As often remarked, even by courts,
it is well-known that hernias are frequently suffered without an im-
mediate prostration. 27 If the majority holding means anything, it
should mean that as long as the hernia is traceable to some fixed
event occurring in the course of employment, whether or not there
was some untoward or external cause, and whether or not there was
an immediate prostration (in the absence of express legislation), the
employee should recover. To prevent the floodgates of fictitious claims
from opening, it would seem that the remedy would well lie with the
respective legislatures, which should enact legislation of the second
type noted above, incorporating the rules of the Commission of the
State of Washington, commented on in footnote 24 herein.
George S. Keller.
24 These statutes used as a model the rules adopted by the Commission of
the State of Washington as long ago as 1914. Zappala v. Industrial Ins. Com-
mission, 144 Pac. 54 (Wash. 1914). Therein, the court said: "The rules adopted
by the Commission governing hernia cases are: (1) There must be an accident
resulting in hernia; (2) The hernia must have appeared just following the ac-
cident; (3) There must have been present pain at the time; (4) The applicant
must show that he did not have hernia before the accident; [and] (5) Hernia
coming on while the man is following his usual work is not an accident." The
statutes dealing specifically with the compensation of hernia have dropped the
first and fifth rules. See, also, Note (1929) 38 YALE L. JOUR. 553; ScHNEOER,
WORKMEN'S COlMENSATION LAW (2d ed. 1932) 1122.
25 CONN. LAWS (1927) c. 307, § 4; N. J. Comp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1924)
c. 236, § 11. Under these statutes, see: O'Brien v. Wise & Co., 143 At]. 155 (Conn.
1928) ; Schultz v. Keystone Watch Co., 48 N. J. Law 104 (1925). The construction
under this type of statute denies recovery to the claimant if there is not an im-
mediate incapacitation. It is submitted that such a statute is unnecessarily harsh
on the claimant.
26 ALA. Civ. CoDE (1923) § 7551; ARiz. REV. CoDE ANN. (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 1439; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 3154 (2); IDAHo Co P. STAT.
(1919) § 6235; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 4884; Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 13609;
PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) Tit. 77, § 652; TEX. Comrp. STAT. (1928) Art. 8306,
§ 12 (b). The cases construing this type of statutory provision are generally
liberal. See WORKM.EN'S COMPENSATION AcTs, 71 C. J. 621, afid cases cited.
27 Buncle v. Sioux City Stockyards Co., 185 N. W. 1391 (Iowa, 1921).
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WILLS-SIGNATURE-PLACE OF SIONATuRE.--Scholars have doubted
whether testamentary power to dispose of interests in either personal or
real property existed in England during the Pre-Norman Period.1 The
Norman Conquest produced great changes in the social, political, eco-
nomical and religious life of England. With the advent of the Norman
Conquest, similar great changes were wrought in obtaining, holding
and transferring interests in property. The Feudal System, resulting
from the Conquest, drew a sharp distinction between personal and real
property, and, as a result, the history of Wills became separate from
That of Testaments.2 After the Norman Conquest, the Ecclesiastical
Courts administered the principles governing the law of Testaments
while the principles governing the law of Wills were controlled by the
CommonLaw Courts, thus producing changes in the substantive law in
the two modes of the disposition of property.' "This tendency of sep-
aration continued until 1857, at which -time jurisdiction over wills and
Testaments was placed . .. in the Probate Court." 4
It is generally agreed that after the Norman Conquest the power of
disposing of land by will ceased, except as to a few particular estates.
This limitation on the power of disposing of one's interest in land pro-
ceeded partly from method of transferring interests in land by livery
of seisin which, of course, could not have been complied with in case
of a last will; and partly from a jealousy of death-bed dispositions of
interests in land; but principally from the general restraint on alienation
incident to the rigor of the Feudal System.5 However, it was out of
natural courses that an effort should be made to facilitate the devising
of land. The demand for this power was accentuated by the develop-
ment of the principle of primogeniture and the consequent desire of
a father to protect his younger children. The landowner discovered that
the Court of Chancery could aid him then through the medium of a
use. Freehold estates could be enfeoffed by the livery of seisin to a
person to hold the legal title to the use of the last will of the feoffor,
and the latter might then devise the use, which devise was sustained
in equity as an appointment by will, and the feoffee was regarded in
equity as a trustee for the person designated by the last will of the
feoffor. From the reign of Henry V to the enactment of the Statute of
Uses, land was freely disposed of in -this manner.
The Statute of Uses was passed in 1535 to remedy the consequent
abuses. For a time thereafter, devises of land were not possible. But
the demand for testamentary power of disposition of land was so strong
1 REPPY AND TOMPKmnS, HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW or WILLs,
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND AmuNISTRATION 4.
2 REPPY AND TomPKINs, op. dt. supra note 1, at 4.
3 REPPY AND TozPrINs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4. 5.
4 REPPY AND ToMPnxs, oP. cit. supra note 1, at 5.
5 2 COKE S17, n. 2.
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that it could not be resisted very long, and, in 1540, the Statute of
Wills was enacted, by which the power to dispose of land by will was
given to tenants in fee simple. During the interregnum, full power of
testamentary disposition over land was established in England. This
power has continued to exist, subject to various restrictions upon its
exercise imposed by the Statute of Frauds (1677), The Wills Act
(1837), and The Wills Act Amendment Act (1852).
Before the brief period prior to the enactment of The Statute of
Wills in 1540, the power of disposing of lands by will apparently had
ceased -to exist. Obviously, therefore, there were no requirements as to
the execution of a will disposing of land. This Statute gave the power
of disposing of property by "last will and testament in writing." Still
there were no requirements as to the signing by a testator.6
Since there were no requirements under the Statute of Wills as to
the signature, there were possibilities of fraud, and the result was the
enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1676, requiring devises to be in
writing and signed by the party devising the same, or by some other per-
son in his presence and by his express direction, to be enforceable. Thus
the signature of the testator became necessary for the first time. Al-
though necessary, it was held by ,the Court of Common Pleas in
Lemayne v. Stanley,7 soon after the enactment of the Statute, that the
place of signature in a will was immaterial. In this case the testator
wrote his own will, the first sentence of which was: "In the name of
God, Amen, I, John Stanley, make this my last will and testament."
The Court held that this was a sufficient signing under the Statute of
Frauds, notwithstanding that -the name of the testator did not appear
elsewhere in the instrument. But, of course, the signature had to be
intended as a signing of the will." The decision in Lemayne v. Stanley,
holding that the place of the signature was immaterial, remained the
law in England until the Wills Act of 1837, which provided that the
will had to be signed "at the foot o end thereof." It is said that prob-
ably the purpose of this Statute was to eliminate the necessity of in-
quiring into the actual intention of the testator in placing his name in
the body of the will, and to avoid inquiry as to whether the instrument
was intended to operate as a preliminary draft or as a final and com-
plete instrument. 9 "This produced so much confusion, litigation and
injustice that an amendatory act was passed in 1852, which declared
that the testator's signature might 'be at or after, or following, or under
6 PAoG oN WILLS (2nd ed.) § 260, citing: Brown v. Sackville, 1 Dyer 72a,
73 Eng. Rep. 152 (1553); Stephens v. Gerrard, 1 Sid. 315, 82 Eng. Rep. 1128
(1667); Lawrence v. Kete, Aleyen 54, 82 Eng. Rep. 912 (1648).
7 3 Lev. 1, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (1681).
8 Lemayne v. Stanley, op. cit. supra note 7.
9 PAGE ON WILs (2nd ed.) § 4; Trott v. Skidmore, 2 Sw. & T. 12, 164 Eng.
Rep. 894 (1860).
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or beside, or opposite to the end of the will,' so long as it appeared
from the face of the will that the testator intended to give effect by his
signature to the writing signed as his will." 10 Under this Statute, the
whole will is not invalid because something is written after the signa-
ture but probate will issue with the provisions written beneath the
signature omitted. This is so even though the provisions were written
before the testator signed, and though he intended -them to be testa-
mentary."1
Before the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, no formalities were
required in the execution of testaments; they could be oral or written;
and there were no requirements as to signature. This Statute placed
certain restrictions on the execution of oral testaments, but it left
written testaments unrestricted. Hence, even after the enactment of this
Statute a signature was not necessary to the validity of a written tes-
tament.
12
The Wills Act of 1837 placed the same restrictions on testaments
and uqlls, in regard to formalities of execution. Thus, the signature
of the testator became a requisite to the validity of a testament for the
first time. Section 9 of The Wills Act of 1837 placed restrictions upon
all wills, in the matter of execution, in the most sweeping language. It
does not repeat the elaborate provisions of the Statute of Frauds of
1677 for safeguarding nuncupative wills. Only an express excep-
tion could save the oral testament. Such an exception was made in
Section 11 of The Wills Act, in favor of soldiers "being in actual mili-
tary service," and in favor of sailors "being at sea," who may dispose
of their personal property as they might have done before the enact-
ment of this Statute.13
Under statutes in this country, there seems to be a distinct division
as to the requirements concerning the signature of the testator and the
place of such signature.14 The statutes of several states, relating to the
place of signature of the testator in the execution of a will, follow the
provisions of the English Statute of Frauds, requiring merely 'that the
will be in writing and signed. It is immaterial where the testator's sig-
nature is placed, if it was placed there with the intention of authenti-
cating the instrument.15 Accordingly, it has been held that, if intended
as a signature, a signing by the testator of his name at the beginning
10 REPPY AND Tom'xns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33.
11 Goods of Evans, 128 L. T. R. 669 (1923).
12 R, rv AND Toxmns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32 citing: In re Taylor,
1 Hagg. 641, 162 Eng. Rep. 104 (1829).
13 REPPY AND Tompxnms, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
14 WIa1S, 68 C. 3. 661.
15 In re Norris' Estate, 221 Mich. 430, 191 N. W. 238, 29 A. L. R. 884 (1922),
and Annotation, at p. 892.
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of the will,16 in the body of the will, 17 in the attestation clause,' 8 at
the commencement of the will and in the attestation clause,' 9 or after
the attestation clause,20 is a sufficient signing. However, it is essential
that the signature, wherever located in the will, must have been made
with a design of authenticating the instrument and that the testa-
tor contemplated no further signing.21 And whether a signature is so
intended is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence in each
case. 22 In the other states, the statutes, relating to the place of tes-
tator's signature, provide that the will be signed or subscribed by the
testator at the end or foot thereof. 23 As a general rule, it has been held
that noncompliance with this requirement renders the will void in toto;
2 4
and it is not entitled to probate.2 5 In England, however, under The
Wills Act Amendment Act of 1852, which is much wider in scope than
most statutes in this country, it has been uniformly held that only that
portion of the will which follows the signature is rendered void by non-
compliance with the provisions of the Act.
26
The purpose of these statutes, requiring the testator's signature at
the foot or end of the will, is that it shall appear from the face of the
instrument itself that the testator's intent was consummated and the
instrument was complete as well as to prevent fraudulent or unauthor-
ized alterations of or additions to the will. 2 7 These statutes, it has been
said, are subject to strict construction and should not be frittered away
by lax interpretations or the engrafting of exceptions. 28 And while it iF
a cardinal rule of construction in the law of wills that the intention ot
the testator as expressed must govern, yet the intention to make a will,
although clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the execu-
tion thereof complies with the statutory requirements. It is the inten-
tion of the legislatures, not that of the testator, which is to be con-
sidered in determining whether the statute has been complied with,29
even though the application of this principle in some cases will work a
16 ,Meads v. Earl, 205 Mass. 553, 91 N. E. 916, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 63 (1910),
and Annotation.
17 Better v Hirsch, 115 Miss. 614, 76 So. 555 (1917).
18 Matter of Acker, 5 Dem. (N. Y.) 19; SCHOULER, LAW OF WILLS, EXECU-
TORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (6th ed.) § 495.
19 Meads v. Earl, op. cit. supra note 16.
20 Hollowell v. Hollowell, 88 Ind. 251 (1882).
21 1 JARmN ON WILrs 70, and authorities cited.
22 Better v. Hirsch, op. cit. supra note 17.
28 WILLS, 68 C. J. 662.
24 Sears v. Sears, 77 Oh. St. 104, 82 N. E. 1067, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353
(1907), and Annotation.
25 In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac. 700 (Cal. 1905).
26 In the Goods of William Gee, 78 L. T. R. (N. S.) 843 (1898).
27 Musgrove v. Holt, 153 Ark. 355, 240 S. W. 1068 (1922).
28 Irwin v. Jacques, 71 Oh. St. 395, 73 N. E. 683, 69 L. R. A. 422 (1905).
29 In re Andrew's Will, 162 N. Y. 1, 56 N. E. 529, 48 L. R. A. 662 (1900).
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hardship and thwart the intended disposition of property.3 0 It is better
that this should happen under a proper construction of the statute it
was said, "than that the individual case should be permitted to weaken
those provisions calculated to protect testators generally from fraudu-
lent alterations of their wills."3 1 In accordance with these principles,
if the signing of the will is not in compliance with the statutory require-
ments, the will is void regardless of the testator's intention in good
faith to make a valid disposition of his property.
3 2
In those jurisdictions where the statutory provision requires the
signature of the testator to be at the end or foot of the will, the ques-
tion is as to just what constitutes the end. Althiough it would seem, and
has been so held by some jurisdictions, principally New York, that the
end of the writing in point of space may be taken as the end of the
disposition of testator's property for the purpose of determining
whether the will has been signed at the end in compliance with the
statutory requirements, 33 the end of the will, within the meaning of
the statute, is the "logical end" of testator's disposition of his property,
wherever that end manifestly appears on the paper; and not the point
which is spatially farthest removed from the beginning or, as otherwise
expressed, the physical end.3 4 The latter interpretation of 'what
constitutes the end of the will is the most prevalent view in this coun-
try and the few jurisdictions which formerly adhered to the physical
end view are rapidly swinging to the more reasonable and just inter-
pretation. And where the will is on separate sheets or pages and con-
stitutes more than one paragraph, it is to be read according to the
obvious inherent sense and adaptation of its parts,3 5 and there must
also be a sequence of such pages or paragraphs which relate to its
logical end and inherent sense, and the signature, in such cases, must
be placed at the sequential end.36 This end must not permit the substi-
tution or interpolation of pages in advance unless they are connected
as indicated.3 7 Courts have sustained wills where the testator began
the dispositive clauses on page one, continued them in logical sequence
on page three and then returned to page two and completed them at
which place he affixed his signature. Courts have also sustained wills
where the signature of the testator appeared on the first sheet to which
30 Irwin v. Jacques, op. cit. supra note 28.
81 In re Andrew's Wll, op. cit. supra note 29.
32 In re Andrew's Will, op. cit. supra note 29.
33 Irwin v. Jacques, op. cit. supra note 28; In re Andrew's Will, op. cit.
supra note 29.
34 In re Stinson's Estate, 228 Pa. St. 475, "77 Atl. 807, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1173 (1910).
85 In re Swire's Estate, 225 Pa. St. 191, 73 AU. 1110 (1909).
36 In re Maginin's Estate, 278 Pa. St. 89, 122 AtI. 264, 30 L. R. A. 413
(1923); In re Stinson's Estate, op. cit. supra note 34.
87 In re Maginin's Estate, op. cit. supra note 36.
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other sheets and schedules were attached and properly referred to on
the first page at the bottom of which the testator's signature was placed.
If the court can read all the provisions of the will in a logical and in-
herent sense, it will not invalidate it even though the signature is not
at the physical end of the will. 38
Another question arises, in determining whether a will is signed at
the end thereof to satisfy the provisions of the statutes, when there are
written clauses after the signature of the testator. Where these clauses
appear below the signature of the testator, there seems to be two dis-
tinct views. The first view contemplates two situations, namely, that if
the clauses are dispositive in nature the will is invalid in toto and not
entitled to probate, 39 or if the clauses, though not testamentary in
character, materially affect the construction of the dispositive clauses
preceding the signature, the will is invalid in toto.40 On this last point,
however, the law is not definitely settled. The second view is to the
effect that where a dispositive clause is found beneath the signature
of the testator, the presumption is, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the clause was written after the execution of the will,
and only so much of the will as precedes the signature is valid.41 This
seems to be the majority view. But where the signature of the testator
precedes matters not of a dispositive or material nature, except as al-
ready stated in this connection, the will is considered as signed at the
end to satisfy the statutory requirements as to the place of signature.
42
Too, although there is some authority to the contrary, it has been al-
most uniformly held that notwithstanding a blank space left in the
body of the will or between the dispositive part of -the will and the sig-
nature, the will is considered as signed at the end in satisfaction of
statutory requirements, 43 even though it is most imprudent as affording
an opportunity for fraudulent practice. The extent of the space so left
is immaterial. 44
Where a clause appointing an executor appears below the signature
of the testator, there is a conflict of authority as to whether such
clause should be regarded as a part of the will so as to prevent the
signature of the testator from being a signature at the end of the will.
As to the importance of such a clause, Underhill says: "In England an
instrument appointing an executor will be admitted to probate where
38 In re Brands, 73 N. Y. S. 1073, 68 App. Div. 225 (1902).
39 In re Ryan's Will, 252 N. Y. 620, 170 N. E. 166 (1930); Irwin v. Jacques,
op. cit. supra note 28.
40 Baker v. Baker, 51 Oh. St. 217, 37 N. E. 125 (1894).
41 In re Taylor's Estate, 230 Pa. St. 346, 79 Atl. 632, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.)
66 (1911).
42 Baker v. Baker, op. cit. supra note 40.
43 Musgrove v. Holt, op. cit. supra note 27.
44 Musgrove v. Holt, op. cit. supra note 27.
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it disposes only of real property over which the executor has no con-
trol, though a will relating exclusively to real property will not be pro-
bated in England, if it appoints no executor; and such wills have been
refused probate, even where an executor has been appointed .... The
naming of an executor was regarded as an indispensable part of a will
of personal property, and a will which did not appoint an executor
would not be probated in the church courts. But this rule has long
been abolished, and the statutes usually provide for the appointment
of an administrator with the will annexed. . . "45 If, of course, the ap-
pointment of an executor was essential to the validity of a will, such
a clause was an integral part of the will, and if the signature of the
testator was not placed below it the will was not signed at the end.
Where, in this country, such a clause is not necessary to the validity
of the will, it has been held that where a will contains a clause, fol-
lowing or below the testator's signature, appointing an executor and
giving him power to sell the property for division, if necessary, there
is a signing at the end.4 6 On the other hand, in some jurisdictions it
has been held that a clause appointing executors is a part of the will.
and that if the testator's signature is above such a clause the will is
not signed at the end and the entire will is not entitled to probate.4T
A will is considered as sufficiently signed at the end thereof within
the meaning of the statute notwithstanding that clauses of a testamen-
tary character are written in the margin of a page or pages of the will
if such clauses are properly numbered as to indicate where they should
appear in the will or where they should be read in relation to other
provisions of the will so as to have a connected sense and render the
will entirely clear.48 But where the marginal clause is not so indicated,
some courts, as in a celebrated Ohio case,4 9 where the marginal clause
appeared on the last page of the will extending about an inch below
the signature of the testator and was so inserted before his signature
was affixed to the will and at his expressed command, adopt the view
that the whole will is invalid. Other courts have permitted the admis-
sion of parol evidence allowing a marginal writing to be considered as
45 1 UNDERHILL ON THE LAW 0r WIuLs (1900) 10, 11.
In Ward v. Putnam, 85 S. W. 179, 181 (Ky. 1905), the court said: "While
at common law the appointment of an executor was essential to a will, under
our statute, it is entirely unnecessary."
46 Ward v. Putnam, op. cit supra note 45.
In In re Blair's Will, 32 N. Y. S. 845 (1895), aff'd, 152 N. Y. 645, 46 N. E.
1145 (1897), the. will contained a clause giving the executors a power of sale
of certain real estate, and use of the proceeds to pay legacies, if necessary. The
testator signed below this clause; but the signatures of the witnesses were above
it. Held, the will was not signed at the end.
47 Appeal of Wineland, 118 Pa. St. 37, 12 AtI. 301 (1888).
48 In re Swire's Estate, op. cit. supra note 35.
49 Irwin v. Jacques, op. cit. supra note 28.
